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Courts deploy dynamic blocking order to combat counterfeit medicines

On 23 June 2026, the UK High Court handed down its judgment in Novo Nordisk A/S v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors, extending an existing blocking order to seven additional websites selling counterfeit and unlicensed medicines. More significantly, the court approved a novel ‘dynamic blocking mechanism’, enabling the Applicants to block further websites without the need for further court intervention.

An interesting and central feature of this mechanism is the authority given to the Applicants to (a) assess whether a website meets the confidential blocking criteria and, if so, (b) direct the Respondents, six Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to block it without any requirement for a further court order.

Background

On 13 May 2026, Mellor J of the UK High Court granted Novo Nordisk’s application (in Novo Nordisk A/S v British Telecommunications Plc [2026] EWHC 1094 (Ch) ) for a website blocking injunction directed at four target websites selling counterfeit and unlicensed prescription-only products.  This decision was in itself significant as it extended website blocking orders to the pharmaceutical industry and the sale of counterfeit and unlicensed medicines, where such orders were typically used to tackle copyright infringements.

Notably, the court found that its jurisdiction arose not only from Novo Nordisk’s registered trade mark rights in the medicinal products that were being counterfeited and promoted on certain websites, but also on the basis that the target websites were engaged in conduct amounting to offences under the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (the “Regulations”).

Dynamic blocking order mechanism

More recently, the Applicants returned to court and sought a dynamic blocking order to avoid repeated court applications as new offending websites emerged.  Under the proposed regime, the Applicants would assess websites against confidential criteria, self-certify any breaches of the Regulations or their IP rights, and notify ISPs of qualifying target websites, which the ISPs would then be required to block.

In his judgment, Johnson J cited the following reasons in support of this novel relief:

  • the court has a wide jurisdiction to make orders against third parties who have unwittingly become involved in facilitating another’s wrongdoing. This jurisdiction is not limited to the disclosure of information. It extends to orders intended to prevent the use of an unwitting third party’s assets to facilitate a wrongdoing;
  • the jurisdiction to make orders against third parties who have unwittingly become involved in facilitating another’s wrongdoing is exercisable where the nature of the wrongdoing is civil or criminal. It also encompasses orders aimed at preventing future infringements where the future wrongdoing is of the same or equivalent kind;
  • creativity is required to effectively target this wrongdoing, as it is fast-moving, widespread, and takes a number of forms;
  • the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (“MHRA”) has had limited success in its efforts to shut down websites, and accordingly supported the structure of the dynamic blocking order; and
  • the court was satisfied on the evidence that Novo Nordisk has the resources and skills available to carry out the relevant and ongoing monitoring with an impressive degree of rigour and diligence.

Impact of dynamic blocking order

The development of this dynamic blocking order represents a significant progression in the fight against the online sale of counterfeit medicinal products. It demonstrates the court’s willingness to adapt established legal principles and remedies to address evolving forms of online infringement.

Critically, it confirms pharmaceutical companies have standing to seek such orders in the UK and through a novel self-certification mechanism the ability to extend the scope of the order without further court intervention. This provides companies with the flexibility necessary to respond swiftly and effectively to a persistent and evolving threat to public health and will likely pave the way for similar applications in Ireland.

Contact us

If you would like to discuss any of the issues discussed in this insight, please contact Charleen O’Keeffe, or your usual Matheson contact.

With thanks to Chloe Broderick Quain for her assistance with this article

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