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Howley v Howard: Supreme Court makes exceptional costs award to unsuccessful parties

The Supreme Court has made an exceptional costs order, awarding unsuccessful parties 50% of their costs of an appeal involving what the Supreme Court considered to be important aspects of the law of maintenance and champerty, where the defendants litigated an issue of great substance and complexity, with resulting clarification of an important aspect of the law.

In an earlier decision in the same case (discussed in our analysis of the Supreme Court’s ruling on no foal, no fee arrangements) the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of two taxpayers concerning the lawfulness of the fee agreement between the Collector General and a panel of solicitors, which included conditional fee arrangements and no foal, no fee arrangements, in the context of a tax debt recovery action by the Revenue Commissioners.

In this most recent judgment, Howley v Howard [2026] IESC 41, the Supreme Court considered whether the Collector General or the two defendant taxpayers were entitled to their costs of the proceedings against a State body, even though they were unsuccessful.

Jurisdiction under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act

The Collector General, as the successful party in the proceedings, was presumptively entitled to recover his costs according to section 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. However, section 169(1) of the 2015 Act allows the court to depart from that default position by taking into account several considerations such as whether it was “reasonable” for a party to “raise, pursue, or contest one or more issues in the proceedings”.

In delivering the majority judgment of the Supreme Court, Mr Justice Hogan accepted the defendants’ argument that it was reasonable for them to litigate the issues, including those concerning the legality of certain fee arrangements.  Mr Justice Collins delivered a dissenting judgment (with which Mr Justice Murray concurred).

Jurisdiction to award costs against a successful State body

The Supreme Court considered the factors identified in Little v Chief Appeals Officer (No. 2) [2024] IESC 53 in determining whether it could exercise its discretion under section 169 to award costs in favour of unsuccessful litigants in proceedings concerning the State.

The Little (No. 2) factors of relevance to the proceedings include that the claim:

  1. is against the State;
  2. seeks relief in public law;
  3. directly raises a point of law of general public importance (whether a novel issue, a sufficiently unclear point of law or, if clear, substantial debate as to whether it should be changed);
  4. is not necessarily exclusively brought to vindicate a right or interest of the public generally;
  5. involves a point of law of general public importance;
  6. is brought by a party that will obtain no personal advantage from the outcome but that the effect of the litigation is “likely to have a significant effect on the category of persons affected by the legal issues”;
  7. that relates to a point of law that is stateable, of real substance and of systemic importance; and
  8. where the subject matter is such that costs will likely have a significant deterrent effect on those affected by the legal issue.

In his majority judgment, Hogan J found that the case satisfied all of these conditions.

Significance of the appeal – importance of clarification regarding maintenance and champerty

In highlighting the significance of the Supreme Court’s first decision, Hogan J observed that “the points at issue … were obviously ones of general public importance. As the first judgment makes clear, the relevant statutory provisions were convoluted and difficult to follow. These provisions, taken together with the general common law principles governing the law of champerty and maintenance, gave rise to much complex and overlapping case-law, not all of which is easy to reconcile.”

Hogan J concluded that case was “almost a paradigmatic example” of the type of case contemplated by Little (No. 2). The issues were of real substance and were fundamental to the operation of the legal system. Hogan noted that “the clarification of the law was, in many respects, both necessary and overdue.” As well as raising a point of law of general importance, Hogan J observed that the appeal “enabled this Court to undertake a comprehensive re-examination of fundamental aspects of the law of maintenance and champerty and, in particular, to clarify the legal status of both conditional fee and “no foal, no fee” arrangements which have become an important feature of modern litigation. The resulting clarification is not a benefit enjoyed principally by these defendants. …Rather, the chief beneficiaries of that clarification are litigants, legal practitioners and, ultimately, the legal system itself.”

In his dissenting judgment, Mr Justice Collins took the contrary view. In his view, the proceedings did not fall within the categorisation of “public interest proceedings” and that, even if they did, no departure from the presumptive rule in section 169(1) was justified. Further, he concluded that a costs order in favour of the unsuccessful defendants was even less justified in circumstances including that they did not have a substantive defence to the Revenue’s claim and in his view were advancing their case solely for their own advantage. Overall, these factors were not outweighed by the systemic importance of the legal issues determined in the appeal (which he also queried as only confirming the “correctness of the long-established and settled understanding that “no foal, no fee” arrangements are permitted in this jurisdiction”). Collins J therefore concluded that there was no basis for finding that this was an exceptional case.

What costs order did the Supreme Court make?

Having determined that the taxpayers met the Little (No.2) guidance, the majority of the Supreme Court concluded that it should depart from the ordinary “costs follow the event” approach.

Hogan J noted that “while the defendants have admittedly ultimately failed, the litigation has nonetheless produced an authoritative resolution of questions of genuine systemic importance which had not previously received definitive consideration by this Court. It would not, in my view, be just that the parties who have facilitated that clarification should bear the costs associated with securing it.”

Hogan J concluded that the case was sufficiently exceptional to justify not simply making no order as to costs, but to merit making some order as to costs in favour of the unsuccessful defendants. The fact that the proceedings arose from the unsuccessful litigants’ failure to meet their tax liabilities precluded a full order for costs, but a partial and limited costs award for 50% of the defendants’ costs of the Supreme Court appeal was made reflecting the exceptional public value of the appeal (with no order for costs in either the High Court or the Court of Appeal).

What are the key takeaways from the decision?

Both judgments of the Supreme Court highlight that costs will only be awarded in favour of an unsuccessful defendant in proceedings involving the State in exceptional circumstances. The court will consider the Little (No. 2) factors but, as reflected by the differing views of the Supreme Court in these proceedings, the outcome of the application of those guidelines and whether the court will decide to exercise its discretion to award such costs is less certain, particularly where the weight of those factors is finely balanced.

This judgment also highlights the importance of the earlier appeal decision in relation to the law of maintenance and champerty (discussed in our previous insight).

If you would like to discuss any of the issues discussed in this insight, please contact Matheson partners Julie Murphy-O’Connor, April McClements, Michael Byrne or your usual Matheson contact.

With thanks to Loren Gavila for her assistance with this insight.

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